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Abstract
Reward contains separable psychological components of learning, incentive motivation and pleasure. Most computational models
have focused only on the learning component of reward, but the motivational component is equally important in reward circuitry, and
even more directly controls behavior. Modeling the motivational component requires recognition of additional control factors besides
learning. Here I discuss how mesocorticolimbic mechanisms generate the motivation component of incentive salience. Incentive
salience takes Pavlovian learning and memory as one input and as an equally important input takes neurobiological state factors (e.g.
drug states, appetite states, satiety states) that can vary independently of learning. Neurobiological state changes can produce
unlearned fluctuations or even reversals in the ability of a previously learned reward cue to trigger motivation. Such fluctuations in
cue-triggered motivation can dramatically depart from all previously learned values about the associated reward outcome. Thus, one
consequence of the difference between incentive salience and learning can be to decouple cue-triggered motivation of the moment
from previously learned values of how good the associated reward has been in the past. Another consequence can be to produce
irrationally strong motivation urges that are not justified by any memories of previous reward values (and without distorting
associative predictions of future reward value). Such irrationally strong motivation may be especially problematic in addiction. To
understand these phenomena, future models of mesocorticolimbic reward function should address the neurobiological state factors
that participate to control generation of incentive salience.
Introduction
Associative learning and prediction are important contributors to
motivation for rewards. Learning gives incentive value to arbitrary
cues such as a Pavlovian conditioned stimulus (CS) that is associated
with a reward (unconditioned stimulus or UCS). Learned cues for
reward are often potent triggers of desires. For example, learned cues
can trigger normal appetites in everyone, and can sometimes trigger
compulsive urges and relapse in addicts.
However, learned associations contain only information, i.e. mere
knowledge about reward. The knowledge may be relatively procedural
in the form of cached Pavlovian prediction errors, or explicit in the
form of declarative representations that model the world. But
knowledge by itself, no matter what kind, is never motivation.
Something else is required to translate remembered knowledge into
motivation that can actually generate and control behavior. That
something else is the topic of this paper.
One reflection of the nonequivalence between knowledge and
motivation is the observation that learned cues are inconstant in their
motivating power. The same drug cue that potently triggers addictive
relapse on a dismal occasion, spiraling an addict out of recovery, may
have been successfully resisted on many previous encounters. And
for everyone, reward cues vary across hours and days in their ability
to evoke desire. Food cues are potent when you are hungry, but not
so potent when you have recently eaten. Relevant states of
physiological appetite, states of stress, or – for compulsive consumers
– trying to take ‘just one’ hit or just one taste of a palatable treat, can
all enhance the temptation power of reward cues. Motivation
fluctuation is nearly ubiquitous in daily life, both for normal reward
operation and in pathologically extreme addictions. Fluctuation in the
temptation power of learned cues needs to be addressed in
computational models.
How can such fluctuations in temptation power be generated by the
brain or be computationally modeled? Fluctuations in motivation
intensity triggered by a reward cue are generated in large part by
neurobiological state fluctuations acting within mesocorticolimbic
reward circuits that react to the cue. These circuits include mesolimbic
dopamine projections to the nucleus accumbens that have been the
focus of computational models of reward learning, as well as larger
mesocorticolimbic loops that use cortical glutamate and other
neurochemical signals. Indeed, dopamine level fluctuations, both
tonic and phasic, are among the most potent modulators of cue-
triggered temptation, as will be discussed below.
Fluctuations in incentive salience evoked by a constant cue happen
because the motivation is generated anew in each moment of
encounter with a previously learned cue for reward. The level
of motivation is not simply a passive function of learned associations
carried over from stored memory caches of previous outcome values.
Changes in neurobiological states dramatically shift relevant
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motivation intensities, and even new neurobiological states can shift
cue-triggered motivation without need of re-training and before any
further learning occurs about the reward outcome.
Incentive salience (‘wanting’) as a distinct psychological process
What is incentive salience? Incentive salience or ‘wanting’ is a
specific form of Pavlovian-related motivation for rewards mediated by
mesocorticolimbic brain systems (Fig. 1) (Robinson & Berridge,
1993; Berridge, 2007). ‘Wanting’ typically gives a felt ‘oomph’ to
declarative desires, but can also occur unfelt as a relatively
unconscious process (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Winkielman
et al., 2005). ‘Wanting’ typically coheres with ‘liking’ (hedonic
impact) for the same reward, but ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ can be
dissociated by some manipulations, especially those that involve
dopamine (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Berridge, 2007; Smith et al.,
2011). And ‘wanting’ can also be distinguished from learning about
the same reward, especially as ‘wanting’ is much more likely to
dynamically fluctuate whereas memories obtained via learning remain
relatively constant (at least until new learning occurs) (Zhang et al.,
2009; Smith et al., 2011).
Incentive salience integrates two separate input factors: (i) current
physiological ⁄ neurobiological state; and (ii) previously learned asso-
ciations about the reward cue, or Pavlovian CS+ (Toates, 1986;
Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Berridge, 2004) (Fig. 1). Integrating
current physiological state with learned cues allows behavior to be
guided dynamically by appetite-appropriate stimuli even without need
of further learning (e.g. Pavlovian cues associated with food are
immediately more attractive to a hungry animal). Incentive salience
can readily be triggered by encountering Pavlovian reward CSs or by
vivid imagery of reward. ‘Wanting’ can also be triggered by
encounters with a reward UCS itself that activate mesolimbic systems
(explaining why it is hard to consume just one small treat). Whether
triggered by CS or UCS, incentive salience typically occurs as
temporary peaks of ‘wanting’, relatively transient and lasting only
seconds or minutes, and tied to encounters with the physical reward
stimuli.
Incentive salience as Pavlovian motivation or ‘wanting’ has several
neural and psychological features that distinguish it from more
cognitive forms of desire (wanting in the ordinary sense of the word).
Ordinary cognitive wanting neurally depends more heavily on
cortically weighted brain circuits, computationally conforms better
to model-based systems, and psychologically is more tightly linked to
explicit predictions of future value based on declarative remembered
previous values in episodic memory (e.g. as conscious episodic
memories) (Berridge, 2001; Dickinson & Balleine, 2002, 2010;
Kringelbach, 2010; Liljeholm et al., 2011). Such cognitive desires are
based more firmly on explicit representations of the predicted
goodness of future outcome, predictions which in turn are often
based on declarative memories of previous pleasure of that outcome
(Dickinson & Balleine, 2010).
One way of describing the difference between cognitive desire and
incentive salience ‘wanting’ is in terms of predicted utility and
decision utility (Kahneman et al., 1997; Berridge & Aldridge, 2008).
Predicted utility is the expected value of future reward, a prediction of
outcome. Decision utility is the motivating value of that outcome, as
revealed in actual behavior such as choice, pursuit or consumption. In
those terms, for cognitive desires, decision utility = predicted utility,
and predicted utility = remembered utility (Berridge & Aldridge,
2008). Cognitive wanting is relatively stable and not prone to
fluctuation in the absence of new experiential learning about the
outcome (retasting), and not as directly modulated by mesolimbic
dopamine fluctuations or related circuitry manipulations (Dickinson
et al., 2000; Wassum et al., 2011).
By contrast, incentive salience carries several recognizable features.
For incentive salience, under conditions of dopamine-related stimu-
lation, situations can exist where cue-triggered decision util-
ity > remembered utility from the past, and similarly decision
utility > predicted utility for future reward value (Berridge &
Aldridge, 2008). In other words, it is possible to ‘want’ what is not
expected to be liked, nor remembered to be liked, as well as what is
not actually liked when obtained. The mesolimbic mechanism makes
such irrational ‘wanting’ possible (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). Two
recognizable features of incentive salience are often visible that can be
used in neuroscience experiments: (i) UCS-directed ‘wanting’ – CS-
triggered pulses of intensified ‘wanting’ for the UCS reward; and (ii)
CS-directed ‘wanting’ – motivated attraction to the Pavlovian cue,
which makes the arbitrary CS stimulus into a motivational magnet.
Cue-triggered ‘wanting’ for the UCS
A brief CS encounter (or brief UCS encounter) often primes a pulse
of elevated motivation to obtain and consume more reward UCS.
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Fig. 1. Incentive salience distinguishes ‘wanting’, ‘liking’ and learning about the same reward. A cue’s learned associations (CS) or a UCS reward are each an input
to potentially trigger ‘wanting’ (top) and ‘liking’ (bottom). Natural appetite or satiety states act as kappa factor in the Zhang equation to modulate both ‘wanting’ and
‘liking’ for relevant reward UCS and CS. Dopamine drug and mesolimbic sensitization act more selectively to modulate only incentive salience because of the
special dopamine relation to ‘wanting’ mechanisms. Re-drawn from Robinson & Berridge (1993), based on concepts from Toates (1986) and Bindra (1978).
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This is a signature feature of incentive salience. In daily life, the
smell of food may make you suddenly feel hungry, when you
hadn’t felt that way a minute before. In animal neuroscience
experiments, a CS for reward may trigger a more frenzied pulse of
increased instrumental efforts to obtain that associated UCS reward
in situations that purify the measurement of incentive salience, such
as in Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) experiments (Wyvell &
Berridge, 2000, 2001; Holland, 2004; Pecina et al., 2006a,b; Talmi
et al., 2008; Corbit & Balleine, 2011; Ostlund & Maidment, 2012).
Similarly, including a CS can often spur increased consumption of
a reward UCS by rats or people, compared with consumption of the
same UCS when CSs are absent (Weingarten, 1983; Cornell et al.,
1989; Everitt et al., 2001; Caggiula et al., 2002; Holland &
Petrovich, 2005; Petrovich, 2011). Thus, Pavlovian cues can elicit
pulses of increased motivation to consume their UCS reward,
whetting and intensifying the appetite. However, the motivation
power is never simply in the cues themselves or their associations,
as cue-triggered motivation can be easily modulated and reversed
by drugs, hungers, satieties, etc., as discussed below.
Cue as attractive motivational magnets
When a Pavlovian CS+ is attributed with incentive salience it not
only triggers ‘wanting’ for its UCS, but often the cue itself
becomes highly attractive – even to an irrational degree. This cue
attraction is another signature feature of incentive salience. The CS
becomes hard not to look at (Wiers & Stacy, 2006; Hickey et al.,
2010a; Piech et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011). The CS even
takes on some incentive properties similar to its UCS. An attractive
CS often elicits behavioral motivated approach, and sometimes an
individual may even attempt to ‘consume’ the CS somewhat as its
UCS (e.g. eat, drink, smoke, have sex with, take as drug).
‘Wanting’ of a CS can also turn the formerly neutral stimulus into
an instrumental conditioned reinforcer, so that an individual will
work to obtain the cue (however, there exist alternative psycho-
logical mechanisms for conditioned reinforcement too). Many
studies measure the attractive ‘motivational magnet’ properties of
a ‘wanted’ CS as sign-tracking or autoshaping. In animal sign-
tracking experiments, for example, motivational magnet properties
are seen when rats seek, approach and intensely sniff, nibble and
bite a Pavlovian CS that predicts sucrose UCS, even if that nibbled
cue is only an inedible piece of metal which has previously poked
into the chamber through the wall to predict delivery of each
sucrose pellet (Uslaner et al., 2006; Saunders & Robinson, 2010,
2011). Likewise, pigeons may attempt to eat-peck a CS that is an
illuminated bit of plastic previously associated with grain UCS, or
drink-peck another CS bit of plastic associated with water UCS
(Jenkins & Moore, 1973; Allan & Zeigler, 1994). Similarly, for a
CS that predicts a sexual female partner UCS, a male quail may
attempt to copulate with a piece of stuffed terrycloth (Domjan,
2005; Cetinkaya & Domjan, 2006). In people, for a drug UCS,
human crack cocaine addicts have been known to ‘chase ghosts’,
meaning to scrabble on the ground on hands and knees after white
specks that are only sugar grains or stone pebbles (Rosse et al.,
1993, 1994), or even to put white pebbles from the ground into
their crack pipes and try to light them (S. V. Mahler, personal
communication, 2008). And some human cigarette smokers may
actually prefer to puff on a nicotine-free cigarette (i.e. consume CS
alone, without UCS) rather than to receive an injected bolus of
nicotine directly into their veins (receive drug UCS alone, without
CS) if those are the choices offered (Rose et al., 2010). Again,
however, the attraction to CS is not purely in the learned
association, but instead can fluctuate with neurobiological factors
(Mahler & Berridge, 2009; DiFeliceantonio & Berridge, 2010;
Piech et al., 2010; Robinson & Berridge, 2010).
In such Pavlovian cases where cues elicit desire, the incentive
motivation seems at first glance almost entirely learned and carried
by the CS as a simple property of its associative history. That
purely learned appearance is an illusion. Because incentive salience
is generated afresh by mesocorticolimbic circuits each time the
stimulus is re-encountered, room arises in the brain computation of
CS-triggered ‘wanting’ to incorporate a second source of input
besides previously learned cached values of the reward outcome in
the past. That second source of motivation is the neurobiological
state of mesolimbic circuits at the moment the cue is re-
encountered, and it is always ready to go to work whenever
opportunity arises. For example, as a general rule, cue-triggered
‘wanting’ for UCS elicited by a CS can be dramatically intensified
in re-encounter if dopamine levels in nucleus accumbens are
elevated above normal at that moment by a drug such as
amphetamine or by neural sensitization induced by previous
exposures to amphetamine or related drugs (Wyvell & Berridge,
2000, 2001; Tindell et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2011). Neurobiolog-
ical state also includes physiological factors stemming from natural
appetites of hunger or thirst or salt appetite, even if new and never
previously experienced (induced by orexin, leptin, angiotensin II,
aldosterone and related hormones), and these natural appetites are
of course the evolutionary reason why a second source of
motivation input exists (Fudim, 1978; Berridge & Schulkin, 1989;
Tindell et al., 2009). The neurobiological state factor also includes
drugs of misuse (e.g. intoxication priming by a drug on board), as
well as longer term consequences of withdrawal, especially
involving permanent sensitization states (Wyvell & Berridge,
2000, 2001; Tindell et al., 2005; Mahler & Berridge, 2009; Smith
et al., 2011). Finally, the neurobiological state factor also includes
stress states involving elevated corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF)
signals in mesocorticolimbic circuits that can recruit dopamine
participation (Pecina et al., 2006a; Berridge et al., 2010; Dallman,
2010). All of these states can amplify the dynamic translation of a
relevant Pavlovian CS for reward into motivation at the moment the
cue is re-encountered, intensifying the level of ‘wanting’. Con-
versely, cue-triggered ‘wanting’ can be suppressed by drugs that
block dopamine receptors (Dickinson et al., 2000; Wassum et al.,
2011), and ‘wanting’ for CS or UCS can be virtually eliminated if
dopamine is removed by 6-hydroxydopamine (6-OHDA) lesions or
prevented by genetic mutation that induce severe parkinsonism
(Berridge et al., 1989; Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Robinson et al.,
2005). An implication of dopamine or related modulations of
‘wanting’ means that at the moment of CS encounter, decision
utility can exceed (when dopamine is elevated) or dive below
(when dopamine is suppressed) the learning-based predicted utility
of a future outcome generated from cached memories of previous
values of the reward UCS (Kahneman et al., 1997; Berridge &
Aldridge, 2008).
Some experimental demonstrations of neurobiological ampli-
fication will be described later. For now, the important point is
that such neurobiological states all share in common the ability to
amplify ‘wanting’ triggered by the next relevant CS encountered
in the state, suddenly elevating incentive motivation to a higher
level. The amplification of CS-triggered ‘wanting’ can reach
levels higher than ever before associated with the UCS.
Such fluctuations in motivation need to be modeled in order to
accurately capture the psychological function of mesocorticolimbic
circuits.
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Incentive salience model of Zhang et al. (2009)
An initial attempt to model such fluctuations in temptation power of a
previously learned reward CS was recently made by Jun Zhang and his
colleagues in a dynamic model of incentive salience (Zhang et al.,
2009). I will refer to this as the Zhang equation or Zhang model of
incentive salience. The Zhang model of incentive salience is unique in
that it incorporates a dynamic physiological factor j (kappa), which
can change as rapidly as appetite, satiety or drug-state changes, and
which modulates motivation generated from the learned value of a
relevant CS for reward (rt) without requiring any new learning about
its UCS value in the new physiological state (Fig. 2).
In the Zhang model, the cue-triggered incentive salience or
motivational value is defined as ~V ðstÞ. Computationally,
~V ðstÞ ¼ ~rðrt; jÞ þ cV ðstþ1Þ
The level of ~V ðstÞ is triggered by encounter with the CS that carries
a previously learned association (rt) with reward UCS. The j factor
incorporated into the Zhang model reflects current neurobiological
state relevant to the UCS that has been associated with the CS
(hungers, satieties, drug states, etc.) at the moment of CS re-encounter.
This j factor acts to transform the learned memory or cached value of
r into a particular level of incentive salience. For convenience, the
j state that held during previous learning trials (i.e. during CS–UCS
training) is assumed to be j = 1. As long as nothing changes, state can
remain 1 and ~V ðstÞ ¼ ðrtÞ.
What is important is the j state at the subsequent moment of CS
re-encounter. Only if j = 1 continues to be true at re-encounter, and
physiological state remains essentially unchanged, will ‘wanting’
triggered by the CS match the previously learned value. Any
departures of j from previous value of 1 (i.e. any changes in relevant
neurobiological state) will let the level of ‘wanting’ at the moment of
CS re-encounter be dynamically modulated. If state declines (e.g.
natural satiation state or pathological loss of dopamine), so that j < 1,
the shift produces a decrement in incentive motivation below the
previously learned level. Conversely, if relevant state rises (e.g. an
increase in hunger or taking a priming dose of addictive drug), so that
j > 1, the shift enhances CS-triggered levels of motivation above the
previously trained amount (Fig. 2). As an aside for readers wondering
about an unconditioned reward UCS, although the model does not
explicitly address UCS reward ability to trigger ‘wanting’ (e.g.
priming by actual food or actual drug), it is possible to imagine
inserting a UCS value such as, say, Ut value (Ut for unconditioned
UCS attractive features) as level of innate attractiveness in place of the
learned cache rt value. That would let the model apply to encounters
with UCS as well as to encounters with CS. The value of Ut would be
relatively innate rather than learned, but still modulated by j. The Ut
value presumably would equal or exceed in magnitude the maximum
possible rt value, and Ut would be modulated by kappa in the equation
in exactly the same way as rt for the CS (e.g. for UCS,
~V ðstÞ ¼ ½Ut; j).
Let us return to a learned CS for reward. The interaction of j with rt
modulates the motivation elicited by the CS, potentially producing a
new value that differs from all previously learned values. But where
does the learned value come from? To generate the cached learned
value, Zhang et al. adopted the temporal difference model of
reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1981; Schultz & Dickinson,
2000; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; McClure et al., 2003b; O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Schultz, 2006; Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008; Redish et al.,
2008b; Glimcher, 2011). The temporal difference model is also known
as the prediction error model, and sometimes called a ‘model-free’
algorithm because it contains only a cached value as memory
associated with CS, with no explicit representation or cognitive model
of the UCS or its place in the world (although some readers may find
confusing the notion of an apparently self-contradictory ‘model-free
model’ of reward learning). Zhang et al.’s adoption of the temporal
difference value cache associated with CS for the learned input (rt)
was mainly out of deference to popularity of prediction error concepts
in computational modeling during the past decade and use in
describing dopamine neuronal firing.
However, in my view, nearly any other model of Pavlovian reward
learning could be equally well used in place of the temporal difference
model to generate the learned (rt) value associated with CS and be
plugged into the Zhang model to interact with j. As new Pavlovian
algorithms are suggested to replace the temporal difference model,
they could reasonably replace the associative inputs in the Zhang
equation. What is important for motivation during the moment of cue
re-encounter is the interaction of j with rt, and not so much the
particular Pavlovian learning algorithm that generates the previously
learned value of rt.
Fig. 2. Simulations of upshifts in CS temptation power. Zhang equations simulate actual enhancements in CS attractiveness induced by increases in kappa factor
(Zhang et al., 2009). Multiplicative amplification of level of ‘wanting’ elicited by reward CS shown on left, induced by a new intoxication state (e.g. amphetamine)
or by a mesolimbic sensitization state existing at the moment of cue re-encounter. Valence reversal from negatively aversive to positively ‘wanted’ shown at right,
induced by sodium appetite, modulates incentive salience of CS previously associated with triple-seawater concentrated salty taste UCS. Simulated data based on
Wyvell & Berridge (2001), Tindell et al. (2005), Smith et al. (2011), Krieckhaus & Wolf (1968), Fudim (1978), Berridge & Schulkin (1989), Stouffer & White
(2005), Tindell et al. (2009) and Robinson & Berridge (2010).
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Whatever learning model is used as input in generating incentive
salience, one general rule arises from the Zhang interaction. Whenever
the same physiological state is used for CS testing as for Pavlovian
training of CS–UCS association, j = 1, and the level of incentive
salience triggered by the cue corresponds to the previously learned value
of reward on prior UCS experiences. In other words, learning and
‘wanting’ levels can appear identical as long as neurobiological state is
kept constant. But in fact, learning and motivation are confounded
wheneverj = 1 state is kept constant across learning and cue test, at least
from the point of knowing which controls neural activation or behavior.
That is, when the two CS values (learned cache and incentive salience)
do not diverge, scientists or modelers cannot tell whether purely learned
value or transformed motivation value is reflected in a mesocorticolim-
bic neural activation triggered by the cue or in a behavioral response to
the cue, and the debate will be endless between learning advocates and
motivation advocates. It is only when relevant physiological state is
changed between training and CS test do possibilities arise for
experimental dissociations between the prediction error cache (rt) and
incentive salience ~V ðstÞ.Onlywhen state is changed can an experimenter
tell whether a neural activation encodes stable associative memory
(learning) or transformed incentive salience (‘wanting’).
Distinguishing univalent changes in ‘wanting’ intensity from
bivalent reversals between ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’
The Zhang equation above simply gives a generic model for
modulating incentive salience at the moment of stimulus re-encounter.
However, describing actual encounters with reward stimuli requires
more specific interactions. The Zhang model elaborated the specific
form of interaction between CS rt and j state into two further forms,
each applying to its own situations. The first form, which is usually
applicable, is multiplicative (A; equation 3a in Zhang et al., 2009):
A : ~rðrt; jÞ ¼ j  rt:
This form applies to the amplification of ‘wanting’ for a reward by
addictive drug administration or by permanent drug-induced neural
sensitization. It also applies to most amplifications of ‘wanting’ for
food by a hunger state. It applies to any positive reward for which the
level of motivation varies only quantitatively between zero and high
(i.e. never goes negative to become aversive). The multiplicative form
makes a CS for a pleasant UCS reward more or less attractive than was
previously learned (but always remaining positive in valence if it was
learned as positive; Fig. 2). This multiplicative form of the Zhang
equation generates incentive salience as:
~V ðstÞ ¼ ~rðrt  jÞ þ cV ðstþ1Þ:
In this multiplicative form, a positive memory cache for the cue (rt)
could be raised into higher or lower incentive salience than was
learned by corresponding increments and decrements in the j factor.
The change in Pavlovian motivation would apply instantly to the next
encounter of the CS even if the UCS had never been experienced in
the new physiological state. That is, the motivation response to the CS
would no longer match its previously learned level. Examples will be
given below.
However, a second specific form of the Zhang equation was
designed for a few particular situations that actually reverse valence
from positive to negative, or from negative to positive (Fig. 2). Certain
types of state do not merely shift the positive quantity of a relevant
reward to more or less positive, but actually reverse CS ⁄UCS valence
between nice and nasty. For example, an upshift from negative to
positive can be produced by certain specific appetites such as salt
appetite (Tindell et al., 2009; Robinson & Berridge, 2010). This
upshift will be described in detail later on.
Modulations of ‘wanting’ that reverse valence between negative and
positive, such as salt appetite or learned taste aversions, cannot be
dealt with by a purely multiplicative interaction, except by positing
negative multiplication values [e.g. rt*()1)] to reverse valence. Such a
negative multiplication would introduce complications of its own that
would distort real-world reversals. Changing the ± sign of a
multiplicative transform would invert the rank order among CSs
whenever several different reward stimuli were in the same family and
all reversed together across zero (e.g. three CSs for three different
concentrations of UCS reward). For example, reversing valence from
positive to negative in a multiplicative model would cause the reward
that was originally most highly liked and ‘wanted’ of all out of a group
of several related rewards to become the most highly disliked or
repulsive after devaluation of the group’s category. Conversely, a most
aversive cue among several for different concentrations of hypertonic
saltiness might become the most ‘wanted’ when valence was reversed
from negative to positive. Such re-ordering is unrealistic. When
valence actually flips in life, an originally most liked reward usually
still remains the best of a bad lot. Likewise, the least aversive stimulus
of a group of negative stimuli may after reversal into positive valence
become the most ‘wanted’.
Zhang and colleagues tried to offer a better computational
expression of such valence reversals in the form of a log-based
transformation in their equation 3b:
B : ~rðrt; jÞ ¼ rt þ logj:
So in this form of the Zhang equation, incentive salience is
generated as:
~V ðstÞ ¼ ~rðrt þ log jÞ þ cV ðstþ1Þ:
Changes in the log j term away from 1 can move the incentive
salience value across the zero boundary during the CS encounter,
shifting the value either up (i.e. increases ‘wanting’, j > 1) or down
(i.e. decrease ‘wanting’, j < 1). This allows polarity reversal from a
negative value to a positive value (with j much larger than 1), or vice
versa (with j closer to 0), without requiring negative multiplication.
(Fig. 2).
The logarithmic or additive version allows several reward stimuli
belonging to the same reward family (e.g. different salt concentra-
tions) to all reverse valence together yet maintain their relative
rankings. Thus, the least disliked of several intensely salty tastes
becomes the most liked during salt appetite, and so on.
Valence reversal would similarly encompass cases in which
dopamine-related generation of motivation switches between desire
and dread (Faure et al., 2008; Reynolds & Berridge, 2008; Richard &
Berridge, 2011). For example, the same glutamate signal disruptions in
locations within medial shell of nucleus accumbens in rats can generate
either intense appetitive motivation to eat or intense actively fearful
motivation, depending on whether the current environment is com-
fortable and familiar or over-stimulating and aversive. Both the
appetitive incentive salience and the fearful salience involve an
interaction between endogenous mesolimbic dopamine and the local-
ized glutamate disruption, and the valence reversal shifts the relative
balance between D1 and D2 types of dopamine receptors at the site that
mediates the interaction (Richard & Berridge, 2011). The additive
Zhang model can capture such dopamine-related shifts that reverse
valence between incentive salience attributed to the perception of food,
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which makes the food attractive and appetizing, and fearful salience
attributed to people and objects in the room, which makes them
threatening so as to elicit active anti-predator behaviors or distress calls
and escape attempts. Related reversals of valence may be clinically
involved in schizophrenia or drug psychosis, where enhancements of
fearful motivation toward some stimuli may transition to enhanced
appetitive motivation toward other stimuli, or from appetitive to
aversive (Kapur, 2003; van Os & Kapur, 2009; Buckholtz et al., 2010;
Dowd & Barch, 2010; Treadway & Zald, 2011).
Limitations of the Zhang model of incentive salience
These features above let the Zhang model capture dynamic shifts in
incentive salience level or motivation valence, even those that depart
from all previously learned values of a CS, without requiring any new
re-learning about the UCS. However, the model still leaves out several
important features of incentive salience. It also leaves out all learning
and motivation processes beyond incentive salience. These omissions
are discussed next.
Directedness of ‘wanting’ towards specific reward stimuli?
Incentive salience is not merely a nonspecific activation of arousal,
vigor or response energy without direction. While dopamine may
contribute to general effort ⁄ vigor processes (Niv et al., 2007;
Salamone et al., 2007), cue-triggered ‘wanting’ is much more
directionally focused onto particular CS and UCS. The CS smell of
food makes you want to eat, not to want something else. A cigarette lit
by someone across the room makes a smoker specifically want to
smoke. And when cues become motivational magnets, they pull
behavior directionally toward themselves. In humans, a visual CS for
reward elicits visual attention and eye fixation. It is hard not to look.
The eye fixation is automatic and involuntarily, and can either help or
hinder an intentional goal depending on whether the person is
searching for reward cues or for a different stimulus (Hickey et al.,
2010a,b; Tapper et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011). Likewise,
physiological sodium appetite makes a rat trace a beeline to a physical
CS for saltiness as a motivational magnet (even if the CS has always
been avoided in normal state, and its UCS always ‘disliked’), but does
not change the attractiveness of CSs for other rewards, such as sugar,
nor make attractive a CS that signals nothing (Robinson & Berridge,
2010). And a CS motivational magnet becomes specifically ‘wanted’
in a manner tailored to its particular UCS: sniffed, nibbled and bitten if
the CS has food as its UCS, but behaved towards quite differently if
the UCS were water, sex or drug.
The Zhang model does not explicitly try to capture the directionality
of ‘wanting’ towards a particular reward’s CS in a landscape that
contains additional CSs for other UCSs. The model never directly
contrasts ‘wanting’ for one UCS vs. another UCS. Rather it considers
just one CS–UCS association at a time, and deals only with the
intensity of ‘wanting’ triggered by that CS in the current state relevant
to its UCS.
To approach directional specificity of appetites, Zhang et al. do at
least posit that each neurobiological appetite state (e.g. caloric hunger
vs. salt appetite) has its own qualitatively unique K distinctive to its
UCS, which specifically modulates only its own CSs, and need not
modulate CSs for other rewards. This helps recognize the specificity of
CS-state–UCS interaction. An appetite-specific j transforms only the
rt of a CS for its relevant UCS, and not necessarily the CSs for other
UCSs. Thus, caloric hunger can transform CSs for food, but not CSs
for intense saltiness UCS or for sex or drugs, and so on.
Narrowness vs. breadth of directional focus
A related omission from the Zhang model is that it lacks any
parameter to express the width of focus in the directed beam of
incentive salience attributed to targets (narrow vs. broad). Focus width
can vary between narrowly making just one single stimulus intensely
‘wanted’, while other stimuli may even become simultaneously ‘less
wanted’, to broadly making several incentives or even many
incentives more ‘wanted’ at the same time. For example, in human
clinical situations, a drug addict may narrowly ‘want’ only drugs, or
even just one particular drug (Flanagan, 2011). Likewise, a cued binge
eater may ‘want’ only foods or one particular food above all
(Gearhardt et al., 2009; Pelchat, 2009). Similarly, in animal neuro-
science studies, width of CS focus for incentive salience can be
narrowed at the whim of the experimenter, via neurochemically
stimulating limbic-related circuits that translate a particular remem-
bered Pavlovian association into motivation toward a single incentive
cue. For example, Stephen Mahler and Alexandra DiFeliceantonio
each found in our lab that stimulating opioid circuitry within the
central nucleus of the amygdala (a component of extended amygdala
circuitry that translates learned associations into motivation), or within
particular patch compartments of dorsal neostriatum (which have
limbic functions related to reward projections from ventromedial
regions of pre-frontal lobe), focused cue-triggered ‘wanting’ more
narrowly in winner-take-all fashion (Mahler & Berridge, 2009;
DiFeliceantonio & Berridge, 2010). Under those conditions, a single
favorite reward-related CS became a super-potent ‘motivational
magnet’ that pulled virtually all attraction toward itself, while another
competing CS simultaneously became oppositely less wanted at the
same time. This was demonstrated in a sign-tracking ⁄ goal-tracking
experiment, in which two CSs (sign vs. goal) compete to attract. In
that CS-as-motivational-magnet paradigm, some rats approach a sign
CS (a suddenly inserted lever that predicts delivery of UCS reward),
whereas other rats approach a goal CS (dish where sucrose UCS
appears) (Boakes, 1977; Flagel et al., 2009; Yager & Robinson, 2010;
Saunders & Robinson, 2011). Most normal rats sometimes approach
their alternative stimulus too. However, drug microinjections into
central amygdala or neostriatum that stimulate mu-opioid neurotrans-
mission makes all individuals narrow their focus further, doubling
approaches to their preferred CS, while simultaneously making
somewhat fewer to the alternative. Sign-trackers emit more intensely
focused sign-tracking, while goal trackers emit more intensely focused
goal-tracking (Mahler & Berridge, 2009; DiFeliceantonio & Berridge,
2010). Thus, cortico-amygdala-striatal state can induce a laser-like
narrowing of the beam of incentive salience focused on one target, at
the expense of attraction to other targets even if related to the same
reward.
Conversely, incentive salience focus can be broadened in other
brain states to encompass several more targets at once. This makes
multiple incentives become more ‘wanted’ together. For example,
hunger can potentiate incentive motivation to obtain deep brain
electrical stimulation as reward, as well as to obtain food reward (Carr,
2011). Amphetamine sensitization in rats can amplify the incentive
value of both food and sex rewards for some individuals (but not
drugs), but enhancing incentive attraction to drug-associated stimuli
for other individuals (but not food or sex) (Nocjar & Panksepp, 2002).
Hunger and sexual cues may both increase ‘wanting’ for money
(Briers et al., 2006; Knutson et al., 2008). Human drug addicts may
‘want’ several different drugs, and some may also be hypersexual or
prone to other compulsions (Washton & Stone-Washton, 1993;
Benotsch et al., 1999; Leeman & Potenza, 2012). Likewise, in
compulsive dopamine dysregulation syndrome that afflicts some
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Parkinson’s disease patients when taking dopamine-stimulating med-
ication, a patient who compulsively ‘wants’ to gamble may also
experience excessive urges to shop or to pursue sex, or engage in a
hobby, especially while taking the medication (Benotsch et al., 1999;
O’Sullivan et al., 2011). Electrical brain stimulation of mesocortico-
limbic circuitry may also elicit quite broad ‘wanting’ of many targets,
especially initially (Valenstein, 1971; Berridge & Valenstein, 1991;
Heath, 1996; Kringelbach et al., 2010). For example, deep brain
electrical stimulation in the subthalamic nucleus engaged mesocorti-
colimbic circuits in a woman to generate intense feelings of being ‘in
love with two neurologists, and tried to embrace and kiss people’, and
then went on to engage in binges of ‘unrestrained buying of clothes’ in
which she spent so much money that her alarmed family wished to
take away her credit card (Herzog et al., 2003, p. 1383). That is broad
attribution of incentive salience indeed. But often enhancements are
much more focused on to a particular target. For now, the Zhang
model neglects width of focus and deals explicitly with only the
intensity level of incentive salience evoked by a particular CS. Width
of focus on target and directedness towards particular CS ⁄UCS targets
deserves further investigation and computational modeling.
Reboosting and irrational preservation of CS ‘wanting’ after UCS
revaluation
Sometimes CS incentive salience does not change so suddenly as the
Zhang model suggests when UCS undergoes revaluation (especially
devaluation), but rather the CS value lags behind. ‘Wanting’ under
some conditions is thus more persistent, resisting instant modulation
by neurobiological state changes or goal revaluation.
The first reported lag was ‘extinction mimicry’ after neuroleptic
administration, originally advanced by Wise and colleagues in the
1970s and 1980s as evidence for the anhedonia hypothesis: a gradual
falling off in pursuit or consumption of a well-established reward
under the influence of a low to moderate dose of a dopamine
antagonist drug, such as pimozide (Wise et al., 1978; Wise, 1982,
1985; Ettenberg, 1989). The signature feature of extinction mimicry
was that systemic administration of a neuroleptic dopamine antagonist
at a dose too low to produce either movement impairment or instant
motivation impairment would typically fail at first to suppress
previously learned goal-directed behavior to obtain or consume the
reward, but gradually performance would decline as trials proceeded
under the drug (sometimes revealed by a delayed impairment in a
drug-free test the next day) (Wise, 1985). That is the pattern that
would be produced by real extinction or omission of UCS reward: at
first the trained animal would still work, but gradually fall off as its
instrumental efforts went unrewarded (although it was pointed out that
extinction mimicry is often not a perfect mimic; Salamone et al.,
1997).
The slow or delayed decrements of extinction mimicry were re-
interpreted as ‘deboosting’ of incentive salience (neuroleptic preven-
tion of normal reboosting) by my colleagues and I as an alternative
explanation to anhedonia 20 years ago (Berridge & Valenstein, 1991;
Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Berridge, 1996). To explain slow
suppression of motivated behavior, my colleagues and I posited that
reboosting of ‘wanting’ normally occurs on CS–UCS rewarded trials
whenever UCS is received, as an incremental mechanism of incentive
salience maintenance that operates trial-by-trial. More formally, a
learning-based computational model for reboosting of incentive
salience was later suggested by McClure et al. (2003b) in the form
of a pure temporal difference model. Their model proposed that the CS
incentive salience value corresponded exactly to the cached value of
learned reward acquired over previous trials, and could be maintained
or decreased by neuroleptic or by real extinction (omission of UCS) on
a trial-by-trial basis. Normal reboosting has several ‘wanting’ effects,
and impairment of reboosting can detach CS ‘wanting’ value from
UCS ‘liking’ value in a gradual fashion.
An immediate effect of UCS reboosting of incentive salience is
priming of increased motivation to consume more of that UCS. Taking
a single hit of cocaine can make a person report higher craving to take
more cocaine a few minutes later (Jaffe et al., 1989), and taking a
single alcoholic drink can make a person more likely to take another
drink soon after (de Wit & Chutuape, 1993). The increase is often
directed specifically towards the same reward target. People who have
eaten a full sandwich lunch and afterwards given a taste of pizza are
then likely to choose and eat considerably more pizza if allowed,
whereas people given a taste of ice cream after their lunch choose and
eat more ice cream (Cornell et al., 1989).
A more sustained effect of reboosting is to increase the incentive
salience assigned associatively to the CS, which becomes evident on
future trials. Reboosting is positively incremental (to maintain
constant an already learned level of incentive salience) whenever CS
is reinforced by UCS reward. The process turns into negative
deboosting to decrease incentive salience when CS is extinguished
alone or when mild pharmacological disruption of mesolimbic
function is introduced, such as by low-dose dopamine blockade (too
low to additionally produce an instant kappa decrement in the Zhang
model). That selective disruption of reboosting prevents the UCS from
reboosting the CS value. However, higher doses of antagonist or a
complete 6-OHDA-induced loss of dopamine would both impair
reboosting and produce an instant downshift in CS incentive salience
in accordance with Zhang’s kappa downshift (Dickinson et al., 2000;
Ostlund & Maidment, 2012; Wassum et al., 2011). The upshot of all
this is that sometimes CS value can detach from UCS value, and
gradually trend downwards by itself if reboosting of incentive salience
is selectively impaired.
Irrationally high and persistent ‘miswanting’
In an opposite direction, persistent excessive ‘wanting’ for a
previously learned CS, when in the interim UCS has been devalued,
is another failure to dynamically shift kappa state that departs from the
Zhang model (such as after some cases of taste aversion learning or
after bad drug experiences for an addict) (Wilson et al., 1981;
Holland, 2004). In such cases, the individual still pursues the CS, or
encounters with CS still spur pursuit of the reward UCS (at least until
the unwanted UCS is actually obtained) even though the UCS would
not be consumed if it were present. In the case of overly persistent
‘miswanting’ after UCS devaluation, the cue-triggered ‘want’ seems
irrational, because the UCS may no longer be ‘liked’. It is possible that
irrational persistence of CS ‘wanting’ may occur especially when the
UCS devaluation, conducted after the CS–UCS reward relation is
originally learned, is induced by a second stage of associative learning
mechanisms (e.g. by associative pairing of food with nausea to induce
a conditioned taste aversion), rather than more directly by physiolog-
ical states of satiety or drug manipulations. Adding layer upon layer of
associations to the UCS may let CS value once strongly acquired
decouple from subsequent shifts in UCS value. Persistence has been
reported most often after UCS devaluation by associative taste-
aversion learning, in which the original UCS food reward is paired
with nausea illness in the absence of the auditory or visual CS that
previously signaled the food (Wilson et al., 1981; Holland, 2004). In
such cases, the food becomes ‘disliked’ yet the rat may continue to run
in the maze to the food’s location. Irrational persistence is also
facilitated by over-training of the original CS–UCS association when
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the UCS is still rewarding (Holland, 2004). Such persistence is often
called habitual, but sometimes the persistence cannot be explained by
stimulus-response habits. For example, the CS may trigger high pulses
of ‘wanting’ expressed as increases in instrumental effort for a
‘disliked’ UCS in an extinction PIT test, where a habit between the CS
and the action can be excluded because the CS motivates an action that
is new in its presence, having never before been paired as response
with CS (Holland, 2004). Rather than S-R habit, I interpret that
persistence at least sometimes as excessive enduring cue-triggered
‘wanting’, which has detached from UCS value. Such cases might
require actual encounter with aversive UCS to deboost the incentive
salience attributed to the CS (Dickinson & Balleine, 2010). In clinical
applications, perseveration of cue-triggered ‘wanting’ might also be
important in addiction and related compulsive pursuits of incentives,
where intense cue-triggered ‘wanting’ may persist even in cases where
the available drug or incentive is known by the addict to be not
particularly pleasant (especially if driven by sensitization of incentive
salience). Of course we need a better understanding of how
detachments of CS motivation from UCS value can occur in order
to incorporate persistence more fully into future computational models
of incentive salience.
Limitations beyond incentive salience: learned cognitive
expectancies and rigid habits
A final noteworthy omission is that the Zhang model also leaves out
all other (non-Pavlovian) forms of incentive motivation and other
types of reward learning, such as cognitive model-based predictions of
future reward value and of act–outcome understanding of how to
obtain the reward (Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Dickinson & Balleine,
2002, 2010). It also leaves out simpler S-R habits. Those are important
phenomena too, but no model can address everything at once.
Habits and cognitive learning about rewards are quite different from
the Pavlovian learning that powers incentive salience. Perhaps the
distinction between Pavlovian learning in incentive salience and
cognitive learning in goal-directed desires may seem subtle, but they
are quite distinct psychologically and computationally, and even have
separable brain substrates (Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Dickinson &
Balleine, 2002, 2010; Boureau & Dayan, 2011). In particular,
cognitive forms of reward learning and desire are more related to
what are called model-based computational systems, such as tree-
search models (called model-based because they contain models or
maps of real-world relationships among stimuli, actions and goals)
(Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Daw et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2006; Dayan &
Niv, 2008; Redish et al., 2008a; Balsam & Gallistel, 2009; Dickinson
& Balleine, 2010). However, cognitive values and expectations of
future outcomes may make relatively weak contributions to the control
of incentive salience (Berridge, 2001; Dayan & Balleine, 2002;
Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; Dickinson & Balleine, 2010).
The difference between cognitive desire and Pavlovian-triggered
incentive salience can produce cases of irrational ‘wanting’ in which
an individual ‘wants’ what they cognitively expect not to like as well
as actually do not like when they get it (or conversely, fail to ‘want’
what they expect to like and actually do ‘like’ when they get it)
(Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Berridge & Aldridge, 2008). For
example, a sensitized addict in recovery (no longer suffering from
withdrawal) may sincerely and accurately believe the drugs currently
available will not be very hedonically pleasant, and not nearly worth
the painful consequences that taking drugs will be certain to bring. Yet
that not-quite-ex-addict may still be susceptible to relapse via a pulse
of overpowering incentive salience if encountering a drug cue when in
a temporary state of kappa >> 1. Such a person could be said to have
an irrationally intense ‘wanting’ to take drugs that they do not
cognitively want and do not expect to like, and do not actually like
very much when eventually consumed. Incentive salience ‘wanting’
can thus diverge at times from rational cognitive desire.
Choosing between models for dopamine’s role in reward:
relevant empirical evidence
Perhaps the biggest objection to the incentive salience model of
mesolimbic function suggested here comes from those who believe
that dopamine instead mediates some other component of reward.
During the 1980s and 1990s, many investigators believed that
dopamine caused the hedonic impact of rewards: pleasure ‘liking’
(Wise, 1985; Koob & Le Moal, 1997). Although a few scientists may
still believe that dopamine causes pleasure, the majority opinion in the
field seems no longer to accept the dopamine = hedonia view (Wise,
2006; Barbano & Cador, 2007; Berridge, 2007; Daw, 2007; Nicola,
2007; Niv et al., 2007; Salamone et al., 2007; Koob & Volkow, 2010;
Aarts et al., 2011). Much evidence has accumulated against the
hypothesis that dopamine mediates pleasure. Evidence from affective
neuroscience studies has shown that: (i) dopamine is not needed for
normal ‘liking’ reactions to sensory pleasure, so dopamine blockade or
even complete destruction of mesolimbic dopamine via extensive 6-
OHDA neurotoxin lesions in rats leaves ‘liking’ to sweetness pleasure
unimpaired (Berridge et al., 1989; Berridge & Robinson, 1998). (ii)
Likewise, normal pleasure ratings are given to sweet tastes by
Parkinson’s patients who have extensive dopamine depletion (Sien-
kiewicz-Jarosz et al., 2005), and normal pleasure ratings are given to
cocaine by normal people who are in a drug-induced state of dopamine
depletion or blockade (Brauer & de Wit, 1996; Brauer & De Wit,
1997; Leyton et al., 2005, 2007; Leyton, 2010). (iii) Sucrose rewards
and cocaine ⁄morphine drug rewards are still behaviorally reinforcing
in the ‘stamping-in’ sense of becoming learned about and preferred
after experiences with those rewards in the absence of any brain
dopamine in dopamine-deficient mutant mice (Cannon & Palmiter,
2003; Hnasko et al., 2005, 2007; Robinson et al., 2005). (iv) Even
elevations in dopamine do not seem to be pleasure mechanisms.
Amphetamine microinjections directly into the hedonic hotspot of
nucleus accumbens to raise synaptic dopamine fails to enhance
sucrose ‘liking’ reactions or enhance neural signals to hedonic impact
in meso-corticolimbic-pallidal circuits of rats (Smith et al., 2011).
(v) Similarly, sucrose ‘liking’ reactions are not enhanced by gene-induced
elevation of synaptic dopamine in nucleus accumbens or striatum (via
knockdown of dopamine transporter), nor by systemic amphetamine
administration, drug-induced mesolimbic sensitization, or deep brain
stimulation of mesolimbic systems via an electrode in the medial
forebrain bundle (even though all of these increase ‘wanting’ for the
same food reward that is not more ‘liked’; as does the amphetamine
microinjection of no. 4) (Berridge & Valenstein, 1991; Pecina et al.,
2003; Tindell et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2011). (vi) In humans,
elevations in striatal-accumbens dopamine levels can become uncor-
related with subjective pleasure ratings of liking for cocaine ⁄ amphet-
amine ⁄ l-dopa drug rewards, but remain correlated strongly and
directly with pulses of intense ‘wanting’ ratings caused by the drugs
(Leyton et al., 2002; Evans & Lees, 2004; Evans et al., 2006; Leyton,
2010; O’Sullivan et al., 2011). For these and other reasons, the
original pleasure proponents by and large no longer advocate the
hedonia–anhedonia hypothesis of dopamine (Wise, 2006). For exam-
ple, even Roy Wise, the primary architect of the original anhedonia
hypothesis, by the late 1990s was quoted to say ‘I no longer believe
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that the amount of pleasure felt is proportional to the amount of
dopamine floating around in the brain’ (Wickelgren, 1997, p. 35).
Instead, from late 1990s to the present, anhedonia has been largely
replaced in the reward neuroscience literature by the alternative idea
that dopamine causes learning about rewards. The dopamine = learn-
ing hypothesis has usually taken the form of teaching signals or
prediction errors in the temporal difference model, or of stamping-in
new associations between stimulus–stimulus or stimulus–response
pairs, and of recruiting neuronal molecular cascades for memory
formation, such as in long-term potentiation or long-term depression
of synaptic signaling (Schultz et al., 1997; Hyman et al., 2006; Wise,
2006; Schonberg et al., 2007; Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008; Glimcher,
2011). So it seems most useful here to turn to evidence that helps
answer whether dopamine actually causes reward learning or instead
causes incentive salience ‘wanting’ for learned (and unlearned)
rewards. In a nutshell, I conclude that although dopamine signals
often seem to code learning (just as many studies once reported that
dopamine seemed to code pleasure), a closer analysis indicates that
dopamine does not actually cause learning about reward. Even the
coding of learning may be partly illusory, because it occurs primarily
under confounded conditions that conflate learning with motivation.
These conclusions are unpacked below.
Prediction error in electrophysiological-neuroimaging results:
prediction confounded with motivation?
Two decades of studies have shown that phasic dopamine activations in
the brain encode prediction error signals in a way that often conforms to
temporal difference models (Schultz et al., 1993, 1997; Schultz, 1998;
Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; McClure et al., 2003a; Pessiglione et al.,
2006; Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008; Glimcher, 2011). However, I believe
that clamping of physiological state in such studies, typically by
employing similar deprivation ⁄ satiety states in both training and testing
phases, has often produced conditions ripe for confounding previously
learned value with current incentive value. Observers may have
mistaken some mesolimbic motivation signals for current value to be
pure prediction signals. Remember that when j = 1 in the Zhang
equation the incentive salience output mimics a temporal difference
model (which provides half the input to incentive salience). That is
because the rt associative input is not transformedwhenj = 1, but rather
is copied directly from the cached memory input value to become the
motivational output. Whenever the physiological state in training is
nearly replicated in subsequent testing, j = 1. That same-state repetition
has often been precisely the case in many electrophysiological and
neuroimaging studies that reported prediction error results. For example,
the original and classically elegant studies by Schultz and colleagues,
which provided the impetus for temporal differencemodels of dopamine
function, typically trained and tested monkeys in a relatively constant
state of moderate thirst. The thirst level was induced by removing water
for about 20 h before each training and test session (Schultz et al., 1992,
1993; Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994). Always somewhat thirsty, the
monkeys always found fruit juiceUCS to be highly valuable, and always
found CSs to be highly and equally motivating once the Pavlovian
association was learned. When physiological motivation parameters are
clamped into such a narrow range across training and testing phases of an
experiment, then only learning is left as an input factor to control
changes in the motivational impact of a CS. Under those conditions, a
CS-triggered incentive salience signal will track learning inputs, and
will appear to be a purely learned prediction signal even if actually a
motivation output. Firing that moves from UCS to a CS looks like pure
learning, but equally well could represent movement of the onset of a
surge of incentivemotivation. Likewise, negative decrements in firing to
an expected but omitted UCS could reflect motivational disappointment
as easily as a negative teaching signal. That is, dopamine firing that
codes Pavlovian incentive salience might often masquerade as coding
learned prediction errors – at least when physiological states are kept
constant across training and test. The same principal applies to
neuroimaging studies of prediction error coding in humans: while not
thirsty, participants are usually in an ordinary physiological state that
does not much vary across phases of learning and testing.
Real life is not so constant. Physiological states often do change
between thirst, hunger and satiety, between undrugged and intoxi-
cated, or medicated vs. unmedicated, normal vs. sensitized, etc.
Fortunately, some experiments have begun to explore the effect of
shifting a physiological state on mesocorticolimbic output signals.
Those results will be described below, but before that it is perhaps best
to say a word about how dopamine manipulation experiments compare
with phasic dopamine firing experiments. In experiments using drugs
to manipulate kappa state below, the level of dopamine is pharma-
cologically stimulated to higher levels tonically over minutes to hours.
By contrast, the brain is normally more frugal in dopamine use: as
suggested for example by the phasic dopamine firing elevations
originally described by Schultz, and confirmed in results of others, the
normal brain seems to saves dopamine elevations for brief phasic
moments of actual CS or UCS onset (Schultz et al., 1997; Roitman
et al., 2004; Aragona et al., 2009; Flagel et al., 2011; Glimcher,
2011). That natural phasic pulse is well timed to facilitate interaction
with cue-triggered glutamate signals at the same moment. But the end
consequence may be the same: namely, elevating kappa in the Zhang
equation, and so the level of incentive salience triggered by the learned
reward cue at the moment of re-encounter.
Manipulating kappa state with natural appetites and satiety
One way to approach the question of whether neural CS signals reflect
pure learning or transformed motivation is to manipulate j by creating
a new physiological appetite or satiety state during the CS test, or by
giving drugs or brain manipulations to create a new stimulated
dopamine-related j state or a new suppressed dopamine state. By a
prediction error or related model of pure learning, the CS value on first
test should equal its previously learned value. By the incentive
salience hypothesis of dopamine function, these manipulations may
alter j state in the Zhang equation to change CS value.
For proof of principle, the emphasis must be on new j states. Old
familiar states, learned about from experience, are too ambiguous for
deciding the question. Advocates of the dopamine = learning hypoth-
esis might prefer to interpret a shift between two familiar states as not
shifting j state but rather as shifting from one learned context or
occasion setter to another, which may conditionally gate learned CS
value via contextual modulation of cached prediction errors gathered
in the past (i.e. a different cache for each state). So let’s escape that
argument about familiar hungers, satieties or drug states, and instead
turn to stronger evidence for testing j state shifts: new physiological
states that are completely novel, never having been experienced before
in an individual’s life and so that carry no learned information at all.
Proof of principle: novel salt appetite
As a novel yet natural physiological state, my colleagues and I have
especially favored induction of salt appetite in experiments to
manipulate kappa (Tindell et al., 2009; Robinson & Berridge,
2010). A state of salt appetite is quite novel for most individuals,
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because most modern humans and laboratory rats have grown up
eating salted diets that contain more than enough NaCl, and so have
never in their lives experienced a strong sodium depletion state. Those
people and rats have absolutely no learned information about how the
physiological state would change salty reward values. Yet sodium
deficiency was frequently encountered by our ancestors and is today
by many wild animals, and mesolimbic-related brain circuits can
robustly generate salt appetite under particular hormonal conditions
that mimic aldosterone stimulation to activate brain limbic circuitry
(especially when facilitated by simultaneous angiotensin II stimula-
tion) (Fluharty & Epstein, 1983; Schulkin, 1991; Lucas et al., 2003;
Liedtke et al., 2011). That hormone combination can be mimicked by
injections of deoxycorticosterone and furosemide, inducing robust salt
appetite within 24 h. Thus, a novel salt appetite provides a strong test
as proof of principle for the hypothesis that a j state shift can directly
transform the level of incentive salience elicited by a relevant CS. The
same motivation principles, once clarified with the novel natural
appetite, can be seen to apply also to more familiar appetites and to
drugs of misuse that act on mesocorticolimbic circuitry.
Our studies have used novel salt appetite to investigate whether a
physiological shift in j state, never before experienced in the life of
the individual, can appropriately transform the incentive salience
attributed to a CS, which was previously associated with intense
saltiness UCS, on first re-encounter with CS alone (Tindell et al.,
2009; Robinson & Berridge, 2010). The taste of intense saltiness is
normally unpleasant at NaCl concentrations much above isotonic
bodily level [bodily concentration is just < 1% NaCl (0.9%; 0.15 m)].
A mouthful of seawater that is three times bodily levels is generally
perceived as nasty (3% NaCl). A mouthful of much more concentrated
10% NaCl solution that is ten times bodily levels is nastier still. Ten
per cent salinity is roughly equivalent to the concentration of NaCl in
the Dead Sea (Dead Sea = 10% NaCl + 20% other salts), and 10%
NaCl is the taste concentration we have used for a salty UCS. On
training trials in a normal state, each auditory or lever CS is
immediately followed by a squirt of 10% NaCl solution into a rat’s
mouth. For such an intensely salty UCS squirt, rats normally gape and
flail their forelimbs to the taste as aversively as if the squirt were bitter
quinine (Tindell et al., 2006). Accordingly, rats quickly learn to turn
away from a CS that predicts the Dead Sea taste (Robinson &
Berridge, 2010). When a strong salt appetite state is induced, the UCS
taste of intense saltiness suddenly becomes pleasant, no longer
eliciting gapes and instead evoking positive facial expressions such as
lip licking, just as does the taste of sucrose (Berridge et al., 1984;
Flynn et al., 1991; Tindell et al., 2006).
But what if the rats that learned the CS–UCS association as nasty
aren’t allowed to retaste the NaCl as a nice UCS in the new j state
before re-encountering its CS? What if they are simply presented again
with the CS (alone, in extinction), which has always predicted
unpleasantness on many occasions in the past? This question can be
answered either from the brain’s point of view, by monitoring
neuronal signals from mesocorticolimbic outputs, or from the
psychological point of view, by monitoring motivated behavior
toward the CS. Both answers give the same conclusion: CS incentive
salience is directly transformed in accordance with the Zhang
equation, so that the ~V ðstÞ interaction becomes equivalent to
(rt + log j) (Tindell et al., 2009; Robinson & Berridge, 2010).
From the brain’s point of view, mesocorticolimbic signals of CS
value from the nucleus accumbens travel most heavily to the ventral
pallidum (VP) (following classic projection patterns of striato-
pallidal ordering) (Swanson, 2005; Heimer et al., 2008; Thompson
& Swanson, 2010). Firing of neurons in a VP hotspot for reward
was recorded by Amy Tindell and Kyle Smith in the laboratory of
my Michigan colleague J. Wayne Aldridge (Tindell et al., 2009).
Tindell and co-workers found that when rats are in a normal
physiological state similar to training, VP neurons fire vigorously to
a sweet-associated CS that predicts an always-’liked’ sucrose taste,
but not to a different salt-associated CS that predicts intense 10%
NaCl taste, which has always been ‘disliked’. However, on the first
occasion the CSs are re-encountered in a novel state of sodium
appetite (induced by hormone injections 24 h earlier), the neurons
suddenly fire as robustly to the salt-associated CS that predicts NaCl
taste UCS as to the sweet-associated CS for sucrose UCS (Tindell
et al., 2009). Even though the salty UCS taste has never yet been
tasted by the rat as ‘liked’ in the novel j state, the new j state
(j > 1) transforms Zhang-style the brain’s reaction to the previously
learned rt carried by CS for salt. Suddenly on that appetite day, the
auditory CS for triple-seawater saltiness elicits intense neuronal
firing peaks for the very first time, and with no need for re-learning
about the associated UCS. The CS incentive salience ~V ðstÞ becomes
transformed as (rt + log j).
From the psychological point of view, a CS for nasty salt that has
been learned about as aversive in the normal body state also becomes
instantly attributed with high incentive salience in the sense of
becoming behaviorally attractive and motivationally ‘wanted’ upon
first re-encounter in a novel state of sodium appetite (Krieckhaus &
Wolf, 1968; Fudim, 1978; Berridge & Schulkin, 1989; Stouffer &
White, 2005; Tindell et al., 2009; Robinson & Berridge, 2010). For
example, Dr Michael Robinson in our laboratory showed that a lever
CS for Dead Sea saltiness, which always elicited avoidance during
training, becomes suddenly and intensely ‘wanted’ as rats avidly
approach and attempt to ‘consume’ a metal CS that predicts a salty
UCS on its first encounter in the new j > 1 state (Robinson &
Berridge, 2010). Behavioral attraction to CS was measured using an
autoshaping or sign-tracking paradigm. Normally rats avoid a CS
metal lever when they have learned its appearance predicts a UCS
squirt of Dead Sea NaCl concentration into their mouth: a rat turns its
face away and retreats a further distance. But on the first presentation
of the metal lever CS in the salt appetite state, rats eagerly approach
and sniff and nibble the metal CS object with consummatory ingestive
behaviors, even though they have never yet tasted the NaCl as nice in
the new appetite state, and on all previous CS–UCS presentations in a
normal physiological state the same rat had always avoided the CS
object (Robinson & Berridge, 2010).
Thus, a novel relevant kappa state can transform incentive salience
into a highly positive value, behaviorally attractive and neurally able
to activate mesolimbic circuits just like a sweet-associated CS that
carries a positive rt, from sucrose pairings, even for a salt-associated
CS that has negative rt. Although the CS was never paired before with
a rewarding prediction error, but instead always with a punishing
UCS, the CS instantly becomes an attractive motivational magnet
when re-encountered in the new j > 1 state. Transformation of a
repulsive CS into a ‘wanted’ CS provides the strongest possible proof
of principle for incentive salience generation.
The general point is that Pavlovian motivation is not simply a
passive readout of cached rt values, but rather dynamically generated
by integrating the CSrt with a relevant j state prevailing at the
moment. It is impossible for a temporal difference model to have
generated the positive status of a salt-associated CS on first
re-encounter: the learned rt from all previous prediction errors
was negative. At that moment, a temporal difference model is
weighed-down by a cache of accumulated learned aversion. To
become positive, a temporal difference model would require extensive
re-training with the CS being multiply paired with the newly ‘liked’
UCS in order to return from negative to neutral, plus more re-training
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beyond that to learn a new positive value. Even a model-based
learning system would be hard pressed to generate any positive value
without explicit instruction that a salty CS should become valuable in
a sodium deficiency state, and no such instruction is available without
experience. But incentive salience mechanisms have no problem in
instantly reversing the Pavlovian CS value operating in a manner
consistent with the Zhang model. Reversal is accomplished by
combining a stimulus–stimulus sensory representation of salty UCS
triggered by the CS, together with the incentive salience postulate that
a CS takes on motivational properties of its UCS, including the
property of ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ being directly modulated by a
relevant physiological state (Bindra, 1978; Toates, 1986; Berridge,
2001).
Human demonstrations of appetite modulation
In humans, a related (j, rt) interaction by physiological appetite ⁄ sati-
ety state might apply to demonstrations by Farooqi and O’Rahilly and
colleagues, who have studied brain activations elicited by food cues in
leptin-deficient people (Farooqi et al., 2007; Farooqi & O’Rahilly,
2009). These individuals have a genetic inability to generate the
satiety hormone leptin, and consequently grow up obese after a
childhood spent demanding and consuming excessive quantities of
food. The crucial observation is that these individuals show entirely
different patterns of mesolimbic neuroimaging activations to food cues
when they are given exogenous leptin medication as adults. Without
leptin, they show an always-hungry type brain signature of intense
mesocorticolimbic activation when viewing foods, whether they are
actually hungry or have recently eaten, unlike an ordinary person who
would show intense activation when hungry but reduced activation
after satiety. Of course, a normal person might have learned to
suppress neural activation when sated due to repeated experiences that
food is less rewarding when full, so suddenly giving leptin to a leptin-
deficient adult is especially instructive in nearly the same way as novel
salt appetite. Leptin administration, when combined with eating a full
meal, dampens the level of mesocorticolimbic activation induced by
food cues (Farooqi et al., 2007; Farooqi & O’Rahilly, 2009). That is,
exogenous leptin essentially opens a gate to more normal modulation
by a full stomach, allowing the physiological satiety signals from
recently eating to dampen mesolimbic brain response to food cues in a
more normal fashion. This interaction might be understood by positing
the combination of leptin and meal satiety signals to reduce j to < 1,
suppressing the ability of food cues to elicit excessive incentive
salience, after a lifetime spent in a state in which j >> 1 always for
food cues.
Drug modulation of CS incentive salience: animal evidence
Drugs of misuse tap into j-state amplifications of cue-triggered
motivation that evolved originally for natural appetites. Drugs
typically engage the multiplicative form of the Zhang equation, so
that incentive salience V becomes transformed as (rt*j).
Dopamine and opioid drug potentiation of incentive salience can be
seen in comparable experiments to the above, where (rt*j) amplifies
the level of incentive salience triggered by a previously learned CS. As
in salt appetite, drug (rt*j) interaction can elevate ‘wanting’ upon first
cue re-encounter in a drugged state, even if that kappa state is totally
novel (Wyvell & Berridge, 2000; Tindell et al., 2005; Smith et al.,
2011). Likewise, enduring neural sensitization caused by a previous
series of drug binges can similarly amplify CS-triggered levels of
incentive salience on the next re-encounters (Wyvell & Berridge,
2000, 2001; Tindell et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2011). Drug-induced
j-state amplification of incentive salience triggered by a previously
learned CS’s rt can be seen from the brain’s point of view, in
mesolimbic neuronal output signals, as well as from the psychological
point of view in motivated behavior and human subjective ratings.
For example, from a brain point of view, drug amplification of cue-
triggered mesolimbic motivation signals were found in the neuronal
firing patterns of limbic output electrophysiological recording studies
by Amy Tindell and by Kyle Smith in the Aldridge lab at Michigan.
By measuring electrophysiological firing of ventral pallidum neurons
that receive nucleus accumbens projections, they showed that neuronal
signals carrying incentive salience triggered by a previously learned
reward CS were increased by microinjection into the nucleus
accumbens of a drug that stimulates dopamine neurotransmission
(amphetamine) or drug that stimulates mu opioid neurotransmission
(DAMGO) immediately before test, as well as by enduring mesolim-
bic sensitization induced by a series of drug experiences interposed
between Pavlovian training and the test (Tindell et al., 2005; Smith
et al., 2011). Tindell and Smith further showed that amplified
‘wanting’ motivation could be teased apart from an unchanged
learned prediction of the upcoming reward, which was embodied in
separate neuronal signal. That separation of Pavlovian ‘wanting’ from
learned prediction signals was accomplished by using a serial CS
Pavlovian procedure, in which a reliable sequence of CS1–CS2–UCS
reward events always occurred in a fixed pattern (Fig. 3). The
sequence is easily learned. In a temporal difference model that learns
such a fixed sequence, prediction gradually moves backwards in time
to the CS1 because prediction error increments back-propagate earlier
and earlier to the first predictive stimulus, stopping at CS1 because
there is nothing before that to predict occurrence of reward (Schultz
et al., 1993; Glimcher, 2011). Likewise, in traditional information
theory (Attneave, 1959), prediction value is expressed as the reduction
of uncertainty or surprisal value (h) contributed by a cue (surprisal
value expressed as h = log2(1 ⁄ P); where P = the probability of
reward). The initial CS1 contributes a large prediction increment in the
form of reduction of uncertainty (H) about whether a reward will
come: from roughly one out of 14 chance of success in predicting
reward before CS1 (log2h = 3.88) in the Smith and Tindell studies to
nearly zero uncertainty immediately after CS1 (h = 0; implies nearly
100% prediction or certainty of reward) (Smith et al., 2011). By
contrast, the redundant CS2 adds almost no new predictive informa-
tion (uncertainty about UCS remains near h = 0), yet CS2 is
associated with maximal motivated responses, and carries high
incentive salience, for example expressed in high levels of eager
approach and sniffing of the dish where sucrose UCS will arrive. Each
CS elicits its own firing signals in VP neurons, and so the order of the
serial CSs thus helps tease apart reward prediction from incentive
salience signals. Dopamine stimulation in nucleus accumbens (caused
by microinjections of amphetamine on the day of test) amplified
neuronal firing signals of incentive salience elicited by CS + 2 to
levels 1.5 times normal levels, whereas neuronal prediction signals to
the CS + 1 remained unchanged (Tindell et al., 2005; Smith et al.,
2011) (Fig. 3).
In a similar way to amphetamine, opioid stimulation of nucleus
accumbens, via microinjection of a mu opioid agonist into a cubic-
millimeter hedonic hotspot in medial shell (which elevates ‘wanting’
as well as ‘liking’), multiplied incentive salience signal but not the
prediction signal: phasic neuronal firing triggered by CS2 was
amplified, but not firing to CS1 (Smith et al., 2011).
Furthermore, more permanent mesolimbic sensitization as a model
of drug addiction can be compared with these temporary ‘wanting’
signal amplifications caused by drugs on board at the moment of CS
re-encounter. Sensitization enhances phasic neuronal signals for
incentive salience in the same pattern as (rt*j), but just in a more
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persistent way (Tindell et al., 2005). Neural sensitization was induced
in rats by a series of amphetamine drug binges weeks before,
interposed between Pavlovian training and the crucial CS re-encounter
test. Sensitization amplified the CS2 incentive salience neural signal
but not the CS1 prediction signal (even though no drugs were left in
the brain at the time of the sensitized test) (Tindell et al., 2005).
Finally, when sensitization and amphetamine on board were com-
bined, by giving another drug injection to sensitized rats on the day of
CS re-encounter, the two manipulations added cumulatively to
produce a super-amplification of the neural CS2-triggered ‘wanting’
signal greater than either single enhancement alone (Tindell et al.,
2005) (Fig. 3). That extra amplification may explain why an addict
who tries to take a single hit of a drug so often relapses into a binge of
further drug consumption: a sensitized brain that perceives reward
cues while intoxicated receives a one-two punch of excessive
temptation signal to continue. The combined state would make
relevant reward cues even more irresistible to an addict, and so more
likely to precipitate a prolonged binge of further consumption.
All these amplifications of CS2 neural signals appeared full blown
on the very first presentations of Pavlovian cues in the new j > 1
state, when the CS was presented by itself in extinction (without
UCS). Indeed, when the UCS sweet reward was finally delivered on
later trials, neither amphetamine-elevated dopamine nor sensitization
amplified UCS-triggered neural signals, suggesting that teaching
signals or prediction errors were not even amplified when CS–UCS
pairing was allowed (Tindell et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2011). Only
opioid stimulation of the hedonic hotspot in nucleus accumbens
amplified neural firing triggered by subsequent tastes of sucrose UCS
(and incidentally, the failure of amphetamine microinjections in the
hotspot to do so provides further evidence that high tonic dopamine
does not raise hedonic ‘liking’ nor amplify a UCS-triggered prediction
error signal, if either of those were subsequently relayed through
ventral pallidum) (Smith et al., 2011).
Yet perhaps these neuronal signals are more difficult to interpret in
psychological terms than I have implied. Psychological confirmation
could be desired. Does amplification of neural signals for incentive
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Fig. 3. Dopamine ⁄ opioid amplification of neural signals for incentive salience. Neural signals of nucleus accumbens outputs were recorded in ventral pallidum.
Two serial CSs had been previously learned by rats to predict sucrose UCS. Amphetamine (dopamine stimulation) or DAMGO (opioid stimulation) microinjections
did not enhance prediction signal of upcoming reward elicited by the first CS1 (which predicted CS2 and reward UCS with 100% certainty) (Smith et al., 2011).
Drug stimulation did amplify > 50% neural signals for incentive salience triggered by CS2 (associated with maximal motivation, although merely a redundant
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of amphetamine on board in amplifying intensity of incentive salience triggered by sucrose CS (Tindell et al., 2005). Reprinted with permission.
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salience actually translate into higher cue-triggered consequences for
real motivated behavior? The answer is yes, as indicated by several
behavioral studies of cue-triggered ‘wanting’ in our lab. For example,
using PIT procedures, Cindy Wyvell found that amphetamine ⁄ sensi-
tization procedures dynamically amplified the intensity of cue-triggered
‘wanting’ surges, in nearly exactly the same (rt*j) way as the neural
enhancements above (Wyvell & Berridge, 2000, 2001). For example,
microinjection in nucleus accumbens of amphetamine just before the
moment of cue re-encounter amplified the height of peak surges of
increased effort to obtain the UCS that occurred each time its CS was
presented and that lasted about 1 min afterwards (Fig. 4). An equivalent
amplification of cue-triggered ‘wanting’ surges was produced by drug-
induced neural sensitization experienced weeks before (but after
Pavlovian and instrumental training), even if no amphetamine was on
board during the CS test. Similar amplifications of cue-triggered
‘wanting’ can be produced by other elevations in kappa state, such as by
raising mu opioid stimulation levels in nucleus accumbens or central
amygdala, or by raising stress-related CRF levels in nucleus accumbens
(Pecina et al., 2006a,b; Mahler & Berridge, 2011). Conversely, j < 1
suppression of the surges of cue-triggered ‘wanting’ in PIT can be rather
selectively produced by administration of dopamine antagonists just
before the CS extinction tests in rats (Dickinson et al., 2000; Ostlund &
Maidment, 2012; Wassum et al., 2012). All these results illustrate a
converging substrate in mesocorticolimbic circuits for state-induced
modulations of Pavlovian incentive salience.
Drug modulation of CS incentive salience: human evidence
In humans, comparable evidence that dopamine stimulation produces
a kappa amplification of the incentive salience attributed to reward
cues at re-encounter has recently emerged.
Some of the most compelling new evidence comes from Parkinson’s
patients, some of who show addiction-like symptoms when given
dopamine-stimulating drugs. These Parkinson’s cases are especially
compelling because such patients escape most of the usual learning-
based alternative explanations that could be offered for ordinary addicts.
For example, the medications are not intensely pleasant, nor need the
patients be in withdrawal, nor is there peer pressure to over-consume.
Thus, O’Sullivan and colleagues reported that administering l-DOPA
medication that promotes dopamine synthesis to Parkinson’s patients
who show dopamine dysregulation syndrome (a syndrome involving
various impulsive–compulsive motivation symptoms under medica-
tion) produced amplification of the incentive impact of reward cues. In
this study, the reward cues were photos of tasty foods, sex images, drug
scenes, gambling scenes, etc., and incentive impact was measured
neurally as increases in mesolimbic dopamine elicited by cues
(dopamine release assessed by raclopride displacement using PET
neuroimaging). The visual cues elicited larger phasic increases in
dopamine release in nucleus accumbens ⁄ ventral striatum when
l-DOPA was administered to these patients (O’Sullivan et al., 2011).
In my view, the l-DOPA administration can be viewed as raising their
kappa value in the Zhang equation to j > 1, multiplying the photo-
triggered level of incentive salience – and correspondingly the brain
level of dopamine surges elicited by the cues.
Importantly, many of the photos were novel to the patients, and
not of their own idiosyncratic compulsion target, and so not the
product of associative learning by repeated CS–UCS pairings in their
previous experiences. Yet dopamine pulses were still elevated when
triggered by the novel photos. The dopamine rise was not merely
pharmacological: by itself, l-DOPA administration failed to elicit the
high surges of endogenous dopamine release in the absence of cues,
just as amphetamine failed to increase baseline levels of limbic
neuronal firing in the animal studies above. That is, high kappa by
itself is not incentive salience. Cues are also needed. Likewise, cues
alone were not very effective in raising dopamine in the absence of
any l-DOPA. Rather, the cues and l-DOPA were needed simulta-
neously, synergistically interacting to control dopamine release in a
(j*rt) fashion (O’Sullivan et al., 2011). In an earlier study, Evans
and colleagues reported such patients who excessively over-con-
sumed their l-DOPA medication in an addictive-like manner showed
high correlations between the intensity of dopamine release induced
by l-DOPA and their subjective ratings of wanting-to-take-more-
drug (Evans et al., 2006). In such cases, the sights and other
sensations and acts related to drug taking might provide the cue that
interacts with kappa state.
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Fig. 4. Behavioral consequences of dopamine-amplified ‘wanting’: CS triggers higher pulses of ‘wanting’ for reward UCS. Cue-triggered ‘wanting’ for reward was
assessed using Pavlovian-instrumental transfer. Testing was in extinction (no sucrose UCS, so responding decreases as trial proceeded). Amphetamine
microinjections in nucleus accumbens selectively amplified the peak height of cue-triggered pulses of increased motivation to obtain sucrose reward. Prior
sensitization similarly produced selective amplification of CS+-triggered motivation to obtain reward (red; separate rats used for sensitization; sensitized rats tested
here in the absence of amphetamine-on-board). The CS had not been paired with response of lever pressing prior to the test, eliminating CS-press stimulus–response
habit explanations. Amphetamine failed to enhance baseline levels of pressing (i.e. increasing pressing peak height, but not raising base plateau that peaks sit on).
The pattern indicates dopamine stimulation did not increase any stable prediction of reward value throughout the session, but rather selectively amplified the phasic
pulse of motivation elicited by each CS that lasted about 1 min. Redrawn, with permission, from Wyvell & Berridge (2001) and Zhang et al. (2009).
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Likewise, Claassen and colleagues reported that Parkinson’s patients
with related impulse control disorders who compulsively pursued
hobbies, shopping or sex, under the influence of their dopamine-
stimulating medications (direct D2 and D3 receptor agonists), made
riskier decisions to win money in a gambling game than when
nonmedicated (Claassen et al., 2011). Those patients gambled by
squeezing a handgrip to inflate a computer image of a balloon, which
paid more money the larger it got but which also ran a greater risk as it
grew of popping and losing all payoff. Dopamine agonist medication
made the patients take riskier gambles, inflating the balloons more to the
point of popping and increasing the risk of losing. Interaction between
dopamine stimulation and risk taking during the game suggests that
dopamine stimulation amplified kappa to increase incentive salience of
the gamble, interacting with their individual vulnerability and with the
exciting perception of the growing balloon (Claassen et al., 2011).
Not just cues for drugs and gambling, but also cues for natural food
rewardsmay interact in a similar (j*rt) way. Drug-on-board can amplify
human dopamine signals elicited by foods in obese binge-eaters and in
drug addicts. For example, several studies by Volkow and colleagues
report that phasic dopamine increases elicited by palatable foods are
amplified by giving the mild amphetamine-related stimulant methyl-
phenidate just before test to obese binge-eaters (Volkow et al., 2002;
Wang et al., 2011). That is, under methylphenidate binge eaters display
greater dopamine surges elicited by the tasty foods (measured by
raclopride displacement via positron emission tomography), than the
same individuals show without methylphenidate (drug factor), and
higher also than in other individuals even under the drug (individual
difference factor; discussed below). Methylphenidate is a presynaptic
dopamine agonist that promotes release similar to amphetamine. The
drug could create a j > 1 neurobiological state to amplify a reward CS
input’s translation into incentive salience at that moment. The higher
surges in dopamine release were seen especially in the dorsal
neostriatum elicited by tastes of their favorite foods, raising interesting
possibilities for incentive salience mechanisms that spread above the
nucleus accumbens. The higher dopamine surges were only revealed by
methylphenidate being on board when the cues were presented, and not
evident in binge-eaters without the dopamine boost, illustrating again
the transforming power of the kappa state manipulation.
Individual differences indicate phasic dopamine signals incen-
tive salience (not learning per se)
Brains are not all alike when it comes to (j*rt) amplifications of
incentive salience. Individuals differ in their attribution of incentive
salience to particular cues, and in their capacity to have cue-triggered
‘wanting’ amplified by drug-on-board or physiological appetites.
Some individual differences arise innately; others may be induced
later in life by experience (addictive drug sensitization; traumatic
stress); and some innate differences may bias the susceptibility to
further modification by later experience.
Several of the examples already discussed involved important
individual differences. Obese binge-eaters differed from other
individuals in methylphenidate*food cue interaction, Parkinson’s
patients with dopamine dysregulation or impulsive ⁄ compulsive syn-
drome differed from other patients in l-DOPA ⁄ agonist*drug ⁄ gam-
bling cue interaction, and sensitized rats that had been exposed to a
series of amphetamine binges differed from non-sensitized rats in
spontaneous ⁄ amphetamine-at-test*sucrose cue interaction. Likewise,
the incentive-sensitization theory of drug addiction posits that human
drug users whose mesolimbic brain systems become sensitized by the
drugs will be at risk to show compulsive ‘wanting’ to take drugs again,
even if the drugs are not particularly ‘liked’, and even if the addict is
no longer in withdrawal (Robinson & Berridge, 1993).
Such patterns suggest that trait-like individual differences exist in
mesolimbic systems that contribute in persisting ways to j states.
Individual difference traits may interact with temporary physiological
or pharmacological factors to determine final j states that interact with
reward cues to produce incentive salience.
Similarly, individuals with high reward-motivation personality traits
(‘I go out of my way to get what I want’; BAS traits) may also show
higher neural mesocorticolimbic activations elicited by cues for
palatable foods (Beaver et al., 2006). And individuals who report
stronger urges to smoke elicited by cigarette cues compared with other
individuals may also be the ones to report stronger urges to eat elicited
by food cues (Mahler & de Wit, 2010). All of these individual
differences might be thought of as involving a more responsive j
factor in the Zhang (j*rt) equation, heightening mesolimbic attribu-
tion of incentive salience to particular cues in those individuals
compared with other individuals.
A particularly elegant study by Flagel and colleagues exploited
apparently endogenous individual differences in rats, and recently
helped to tease apart the role of mesolimbic dopamine in reward
learning vs. incentive salience (Flagel et al., 2011). Flagel and
colleagues exploited an individual difference that occurs spontane-
ously in rats when trained in Pavlovian ‘sign-tracking’ or ‘autoshap-
ing’ situations. Some individual rats (sign-trackers) attribute intense
incentive salience to the CS cue (insertion of a metal lever into a
chamber through the wall) that predicts food reward UCS. For those
individuals, the CS becomes attractive, and the metal lever is
approached and eagerly sniffed and nibbled whenever it appears.
Other rats (goal-trackers) learn the CS–UCS association equally well,
but do not approach the CS lever; instead goal-trackers show a
Pavlovian conditioned response of going directly to the dish location
where the UCS will arrive, whenever the lever appears. Sign-trackers
also ‘want’ the CS in the sense of being willing to work harder to
obtain it (instrumental conditioned reinforcement), whereas goal-
trackers may not work for the lever cue (Flagel et al., 2011).
Most crucially, Flagel and colleagues reported that sign-trackers
showed large phasic increases in dopamine levels in their nucleus
accumbens when the CS lever was presented (measured by in vivo
electrochemistry). However, goal-trackers showed much less elevation
in nucleus accumbens dopamine, despite having equally well learned
that the CS predicted reward (Flagel et al., 2011). Flagel and
colleagues concluded that dopamine surges reflected incentive
salience of the CS rather than its learned prediction. This ‘lever-
wanting’ conclusion was bolstered by their further finding that only
the sign-tracking response was impaired by systemic dopamine
blockade, while the goal-tracking response remained relatively intact
(Flagel et al., 2011). These findings complement an impressive set of
related studies from Terry Robinson’s laboratory that have shown
sign-trackers to be more inclined to attribute high levels of incentive
salience to discrete CSs for food or drug rewards, showing greater cue-
triggered relapse of cocaine seeking or food seeking, and higher self-
administration of cocaine UCS when the drug receipt is accompanied
by those CS cues (Saunders & Robinson, 2010, 2011; Yager &
Robinson, 2010; Lovic et al., 2011; Meyer et al., 2012). In general,
sign-trackers seem to possess an important higher kappa bias to
attribute incentive salience to a discrete reward CS, resulting in
stronger ‘wanting’ attraction to the predictive cues.
Together, these results indicate that enduring individual traits and
short-term drug intoxication states and natural appetites key in
interactive ways to modulate the temptation power of reward CSs.
Although learning, memories and learning-based predictions of future
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outcomes need not be changed at all by these states, they often
powerfully change the motivation intensity triggered by a cued reward
memory. All seem to fit a Zhang-style (j, rt) interaction of motivation
potentiation, in the sense that the traits or states elevate j levels,
without needing to raise the learned prediction rt of the Pavlovian CS–
UCS link associated with the cue. The consequence is to raise the
intensity of incentive salience ~V ðstÞ at the moment of cue re-encounter
while preserving prediction accuracy. The CS thus becomes a more
potent trigger of temptation, eliciting stronger ‘wanting’ for the cue
and its associated UCS reward even if the learned prediction of future
reward has not altered.
Dopamine is unnecessary for learning or remembering rewards
– only for incentive ‘wanting’
Finally, it seems important to briefly mention an opposite negative
source of evidence against the dopamine = learning alternative
hypothesis: namely, evidence that dopamine is not needed to learn
new reward values nor to remember previously learned reward values.
This further eats away at the idea that dopamine surges somehow are
teaching signals or prediction errors that are causally needed for
reward learning, rather than for incentive salience that motivates
reward value.
Going back more than a decade, results of animal experiments have
indicated that even a dopamine-free brain can learn quite normally
about rewards. For example, Terry Robinson and I found that rats still
learned about rewards after losing mesolimbic dopamine, due to
6-OHDA neurotoxin lesions that selectively destroyed 98% of
dopamine neurons in nucleus accumbens and neostriatum (Berridge
& Robinson, 1998). The rats were still able to learn a Pavlovian
devaluation of a sweet reward induced by taste aversion learning as
competently as intact rats. After dopamine lesions, the rats were
presented with a novel and distinctively sweet CS that they initially
‘liked’: the taste of a saccharin and polycose solution infused into their
mouths. On first infusion, the sweet CS elicited normal high numbers
of purely positive ‘liking’ facial expressions (e.g. licking of the lips)
whether rats had no dopamine or were normal (i.e. more evidence that
dopamine is not needed for normal hedonic ‘liking’). To next train a
Pavlovian taste aversion, the CS sweet flavor was paired associatively
several times with nausea as UCS, caused by injection of lithium
chloride (LiCl). Finally, to test if the associative devaluation had been
successfully learned, the CS flavor was presented by itself in a final
test. All rats showed they had learned a complete devaluation of CS
from nice to nasty: all the rats now emitted intense disgust reactions
(e.g. gapes) in the post-training test, and their original positive ‘liking’
expressions had nearly vanished (Fig. 5). The 6-OHDA-lesion rats
with dopamine-free brains learned the Pavlovian ‘dislike’ for CS taste
as strongly as the intact rats that had 100% normal dopamine
(Berridge & Robinson, 1998). However, of course, the 6-OHDA rats
lacked any incentive motivation to eat or drink, and would have
starved voluntarily despite being surrounded by palatable food (and
despite apparently retaining basic capacity for eating movements
though having motor symptoms of Parkinson’s disease) if they had not
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Fig. 5. Normal learning by rats without dopamine: Pavlovian reward devaluation. After rats lost > 98% of dopamine from nucleus accumbens and neostriatum, due
to 6-OHDA lesions, a Pavlovian taste-aversion learning paradigm was used to devalue a sweet CS flavor. Tastes of a distinctive and originally palatable saccharin–
polycose solution were associatively paired as CS with injections of LiCl to induce nausea as UCS. On the first presentation, the CS taste elicited purely positive
‘liking’ facial expressions (e.g. rhythmic lip licking) in a taste reactivity test. The affective reactions of rats with dopamine-free brains were essentially as hedonically
positive as normal control rats. After three Pavlovian training pairings with LiCl illness, affective expressions to the sweet CS taste were reversed in valence.
Negative disgust reactions (e.g. gapes) were elicited by the CS after learning, indicating a learned shift to ‘disliking’. The magnitude of the learned devaluation was
equivalent in dopamine-free 6-OHDA rats and normal control rats. Thus, rats with virtually no dopamine in their brains were still capable of learning a new value for
a reward. Redrawn from Berridge & Robinson (1998).
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been intragastrically fed. Without dopamine, the 6-OHDA rats had
normal ‘liking’ and learning, but no ‘wanting’.
Positive upshifts in reward learning also have been reported to
occur in the absence of brain dopamine, most notably by Richard
Palmiter and colleagues using dopamine-deficient (DD) mutant mice
(Cannon & Palmiter, 2003; Hnasko et al., 2005, 2007; Robinson
et al., 2005). Those DD mice congenitally lack the gene for enzymes
to produce dopamine. Consequently, DD mice show full-blown
symptoms of Parkinson’s disease soon after birth (and so require daily
injections of l-DOPA medication to enable brief meals to survive).
However, despite lacking dopamine, DD mice still appear able to learn
some basic Pavlovian reward associations, such as between a CS
drinking spout and UCS liquid sucrose reward (so as to prefer the CS
spout later), or between a CS place and drug UCS reward even in
absence of l-DOPA (so as to return to the place later) (Cannon &
Palmiter, 2003; Hnasko et al., 2005, 2007; Robinson et al., 2005). DD
mice also can learn an instrumental maze or spatial map association
needed to find food reward, at least with the help of caffeine
(Robinson et al., 2005), and all presumably without any phasic
dopamine teaching signals.
Of course, advocates of dopamine-learning theories may reply that
only some forms of reward learning require dopamine according to
their hypothesis, not all learning, and so these tests may have missed
the particular forms of learning that need dopamine. That is indeed
possible, but what particular forms of learning would those advocates
suggest remain to need dopamine? Pavlovian reward learning was the
original source of the dopamine prediction error hypothesis, and the
temporal difference model is frequently presented in the context of
Pavlovian predictions of reward (Schultz et al., 1997; Dayan &
Balleine, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Glimcher, 2011). But
Pavlovian learning of reward revaluation seems quite possible without
phasic dopamine prediction errors. If not for Pavlovian reward
learning, then for what learning is dopamine needed?
Still, I must grant that dopamine-free DD mice have deficits in
avoidance learning tests and in learning instrumental lever-press tasks
(Fadok et al., 2009; Darvas & Palmiter, 2010; Darvas et al., 2011).
Also, dopamine manipulation by drugs have been reported to change
learning and learned performance in people (Pessiglione et al., 2006;
Moustafa et al., 2008; Samson et al., 2010). However, I suspect many
of these learning modulation reports have alternative explanations in
the form of motivational ⁄ attentional ⁄ effort effects, which only
indirectly influence learning, and might not actually change learning
mechanisms after all (Salamone et al., 2007; Aarts et al., 2011). Most
human studies so far that have reported dopamine blockade to interfere
with learned performance, or psychostimulants to enhance perfor-
mance, never explicitly asked whether their apparent change in
learning might be alternatively explained by a drug-induced change in
motivation or attention. Instead they simply ask whether acquisition of
the learned task was altered by the drug, and take any positive answer
to be support for the prediction error model, without considering
alternative explanations. That sets the evidence bar too low.
Fortunately, a few human studies are now beginning to compare
alternative explanations when evaluating prediction error hypotheses.
As just a couple examples, Nagy and colleagues recently reported that
administering direct dopamine D2 ⁄D3 agonist medications to Parkin-
son’s patients helped them to learn a reward prediction task (Nagy
et al., 2011). However, the learning improvement appeared indirect
and mediated secondarily by a more direct enhancement of incentive
salience attributed to reward predictive cues. That was revealed in the
finding that even some irrelevant or nonpredictive cues were attributed
to aberrant incentive salience after medication, leading to illusory
associations and correlated also with psychotic-like symptoms of
hallucinatory experiences and perceptual aberrations. The results led
Nagy and colleagues to conclude that ‘dopamine agonists do not
selectively enhance adaptive reward learning, but increase general
salience signals leading to illusory and aberrant stimulus–reward
associations’ (Nagy et al., 2011, p. 8).
Similarly, Sharot and colleagues gave l-DOPA to normal people
before asking them to imagine a potential future vacation in Greece or
Thailand, and on another day asked them to imagine the alternative
vacation without drug (Sharot et al., 2009). Later, when asked to
choose which vacation they would prefer, participants picked the one
they had imagined while under l-DOPA, and guessed that they would
be happier in the drug-associated location than in the other location.
Sharot et al. (2009) noted that their results suggested that ‘dopamine…
enhanced a prediction of pleasure associated with a future event’,
perhaps because it had strengthened learning of an association on the
drugged day, consistent with increased prediction error. But, alterna-
tively, they noted their results could equally have been explained by the
hypothesis that ‘administration of L-Dopa might be construed as
enhancing incentive salience attributed to imagined stimuli’ (Sharot
et al., 2009). Which explanation is correct? Sharot et al. concluded,
‘The current study cannot distinguish between these two possibilities’.
That is exactly right, and the authors deserve credit for acknowledging
the interpretation remains an open question. After all, generations of
students have taken amphetamine and related psychostimulant drugs to
help them study and take tests. But most readers might think those drugs
aided chiefly to keep the tired students interested, alert, attentive and
quick of mind – not by mimicking phasic teaching signals or prediction
errors in their mesolimbic systems. Similar recognition of ambiguities
have led to recent suggestions that prediction error, learning and
hedonia formulations of other pathologies such as schizophrenia or
depression may be better reformulated as hypotheses based more on
motivation and attention features of those conditions (Kapur, 2003; van
Os & Kapur, 2009; Barch & Dowd, 2010; Buckholtz et al., 2010;
Treadway & Zald, 2011).
Conclusion
Pavlovian CSs associated with reward must be dynamically translated
into incentive salience each time the CS is re-encountered to motivate
reward seeking and consumption. The translation of CS association into
motivation is influenced by current neurobiological states of mesocor-
ticolimbic systems, including dopamine states, in a Zhang-style (j, rt)
interaction at the moment of cue re-encounter. Natural appetite or
satiety states, stress states, pharmacological states related to addictive
drugs and related medications, and individual differences all powerfully
modulate the j factor in the interaction and so change the level of
incentive salience produced by the rt of the CS at that moment ~V ðstÞ.
Such modulation helps explain fluctuations in the power of a given cue
or context to trigger temptations. Of course, much more remains to be
done to create models that more realistically capture the translation of
learned knowledge into motivation. Exciting opportunities exist for
future models to better incorporate neurobiological-state modulation of
cue-triggered temptation, so as to better capture the reality of how
mesocorticolimbic circuits generate motivation for rewards.
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